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 Emergent Aesthetics-
 Aesthetic Issues in Computer Arts
 Mihai Nadin
 he production of art, as much as any other
 production, takes place in the context of human interac-
 tion-with others, with nature, with tools, with artifacts, and
 with ideas from times passed. Artistic work, more than any
 other, is probably a projection of the experiential structure
 of the act of producing artifacts (or events) with qualities so-
 cially acknowledged as artistic and values culturally cele-
 brated as aesthetic. Throughout history, the patterns of
 human interaction have continuously changed, and so has
 art. Nonetheless, changes like the ones we experience today
 are unprecedented, requiring that we understand that the
 condition of art is probably more dependent than ever on
 the condition of humanity in general, and of science and
 technology in particular.
 The age of information processing implies networking
 and interactivity. In a broad sense, this age can be under-
 stood as one of a generalized electronic medium against
 whose background digital and non-digital activities take
 place. It is not that, in the age of information processing,
 tradition or tradition-rooted forms of human practice cease;
 they are complemented by new forms, some impractical or
 even impossible in previous paradigms of thinking and
 creating. Two lines-one of continuity that establishes itself
 as an implicit reference and another of uncompromising
 revolution/radical change-could represent the topology
 of the space of artistic or scientific exploration as it results
 from the integration of the information-processing para-
 digm and the computer associated with it in our culture.
 These two lines follow various directions, which sometimes
 meet, run in parallel directions, and at some time diverge.
 I am suggesting this visual representation to make clear from
 the outset that the process is not of exclusion, but of
 diversification.
 This said, it is time to examine what we address as com-
 puter art and to try to understand why, despite expectations
 (some very high) and tedious work, despite major invest-
 ment (easily approaching the billion dollar mark and ex-
 ceeding any other investment made in art), and despite en-
 thusiasm, the results have been rather minor. Thisjudgment
 can be questioned and contradicted, unless and until the
 perspective from which it is justified is defined. Indeed, if
 we include in our notion of computer art computer graphics
 in general, modeling, desktop publishing, simulation, im-
 age processing, and animation, as well as sound and image
 synthesis (I have not mentioned everything that might qual-
 ify), the argument of economic success, novelty and cultural
 impact will be impossible to refute. Moreover, the invisible
 participation of the computer in photography, film, video,
 music and graphic design technologies will definitely chal-
 lenge the notion that the results achieved are minor. This
 is where the two lines of development-tradition and
 ? 1989 ISAST
 Pergamon Press pic. Printed in Japan.
 0024-094X/89 $3.00+0.00
 renewal-meet. New technologies are integrated into
 established forms of artistic practice and make possible a
 r tionalization of previous work and a wider dissemination
through channels of mass communication. The photo-
 g aphic camera controlled by a chip achieves what Eastman
 made the program of his house. Computer-supported
 graphic design, especially typesetting, has introduced
 means of increased productivity, quality control and varia-
 tion unknown before. Nevertheless, once these and other
 ex mples are acknowledged, a feeling of dissatisfaction
 lingers. Computer-generated art and electronic music are
 interesting, and some works are provocative in their novelty.
But once we have seen a computer graphic image or listened
 to a computer-generated piece of music, it seems that we
 have seen and heard them all. In animation, after an initial
 p iod of surprise and hope, we now know that not much
 progress has been made from the first flying logos to the
 most recent (and ridiculous) flying flame of the NBC-
 televised Olympics, although technology has matured quite
 a bit and we have accumulated more than a fair share of ex-
 pe ience. As opposed to works of art that look better the
 more we look at them, electronic art seems to exhaust itself
 at the first encounter.
 These critical remarks describing the current state of
 computer art would not be more than an expression of dis-
 appointment and even subjective evaluation were it not for
 the need they trigger to go beyond these weaknesses and to
 approach basic issues as they pertain to the new aesthetic ex-
 perience with the computer. These include the following:
 1. the relation between a traditional notion of art and the
 emergent aesthetics of new forms of artistic practice
 2. the relation between explanatory models of art and the
 generative power of explanations
 3. the relation between technology and art, with special
 emphasis on digital technology
 4. the relevance of an aesthetic consciousness for diver-
 sified artistic practice
 In approaching these questions, and keeping in mind
 their implications and ramifications, I am aware that no
 simple answers can be given; furthermore, while any dis-
 course about individual works of art can take place only after
 the work, nothing precludes a discussion of art as a form of
 participation in the process through which the artwork be-
 comes possible. My own involvement with art and computers
 extends over 20 years. Although the fact that I have written
 programs and produced images or musical pieces does not
 necessarily make me the bearer of truth, my experience re-
 flects an understanding of the subject and guarantees that
 my views will be accessible even to those who disagree with
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 them, because we share in the lan-
 guage of the technology and in the
 commitment to research its potential.
 CONTEXT OF
 CONFLICT
 It is a commonplace that new forms of
 art emerge in a context of conflict with
 established art. As with many other
 patterns of human interaction, artistic
 activity is prone to establish its own
 power base and to exercise it economi-
 cally, politically, ethically and in other
 ways. This happens through institu-
 tions and through reified moral values
 as reflected through laws, religions,
 schools and universities. Computer art
 is probably the best example of the at-
 tempt made by established art to ap-
 propriate and limit the efficiency of
 the new technology. In actuality it is
 the fight between that which is old,
 respectable, valuable, significant, pro-
 gressively integrated into culture and
 tradition, and the new promise, chal-
 lenge, and hope-the beginning of a
 new civilization. I certainly doubt that
 the plethora of mediocre images in
 continuation of the traditional realis-
 tic, surrealistic, expressionistic, etc. art
 can be attributed to imitation as an ob-
 ligatory phase in every new develop-
 ment. It is more than an imitation
 phase-which we all resignedly accept
 as a given (children imitate adults,
 don't they?)-and different from mi-
 mesis. My thesis is that, in the process
 of appropriating this particular new
 technology-which is fundamentally
 changing the nature of human prax-
 is-traditional artists, technologists
 and scientists have acted to preserve
 modes of expression they believe in,
 like or have tried to explain. Patterns
 of human interaction, in particular
 those pertinent to work, social exist-
 ence, artistic activity and communica-
 tion, are so deeply ingrained that un-
 certainty about and unpreparedness
 for the new explain the opposition to
 everything that does not preserve
 prior experiences wholly or at least in
 part. Symptomatically, we have tried to
 convert the revolution into an evolu-
 tion, to see it as a cycle in a dynamics
 of progress, not as a dislocation of
 rigid and exhausted forms of thinking,
 working or creating. In the arts, prob-
 ably more than in any other field of
 human interaction, one notices how
 encompassing the change can be.
 While traditionally open to experi-
 ment, renewal and innovation, and
 often assuming social roles of exem-
 plary activism, artists did not oppose
 the technology, but hoped that it
 would not affect their studios and ways
 of working; some even hoped that it
 would go away. Since this has not hap-
 pened, those who wanted to give it a
 chance have discovered that the issue
 is one of change-in the technology
 or in themselves. Since the latter
 requires more than good will and in-
 vestment into what we know today as
 user-friendliness, they opted for the
 former. The programs we use-ren-
 dering, image mapping, ray tracing, to
 name a few-do not contradict pre-
 vious modes of expression but actually
 capture them in some computational
 form and make them available in ever-
 friendlier forms to 'Sunday painters'
 (as Negroponte once aptly called
 them [1]). We simply took the new
 tool and forced it to solve old prob-
 lems, whose answers we knew ahead of
 time. With each work produced with
 the help of the machine that matched
 the answer, we became more em-
 phatic.
 Obviously, at the beginning, power
 relations specific to artistic praxis were
 exercised gently. The maturing of the
 technology and its gradually higher
 price-I refer not to components,
 which became cheaper, but to the
 more complex configurations re-
 quired by the complexity of the task,
 which require considerable invest-
 ment-give these power relations ag-
 gressive, even brutal aspects. Although
 the new paradigm refers to and ap-
 plies a reality different from the physi-
 cal matter involved in previous forms
 of artistic practice (i.e. clay, cameras,
 marble, pigment-based colors, etc.),
 we stubbornly try to rediscover the old
 (assumed to be not only good, but also
 universal and eternal) and to preserve
 it. It should not be a surprise that fraud
 and ignorance have often played
 important roles in this practice of pres-
 ervation. In order to make the new
 available, we have enrolled everyone
 willing to support it. The result is not
 unexpected: almost without excep-
 tion, computer art classes are taught
 by those who never succeeded in their
 art. The new talent exhibited by tech-
 nologists, scientists and self-made ar-
 tists is met with suspicion and typically
 'brought into line'. Even the new pos-
 sibilities opened up by technology
 have been reduced to acknowledged
 procedures. Visualization of highly di-
 versified spaces, 3D (virtual space) ex-
 plorations and color explorations are
 still treated according to the aesthetics
 of white paper or canvas. This is why,
 although formally correct, some of the
 new imagery is expressively inade-
 quate. Technical ignorance and aes-
 thetic limitations explain the success
 of paint box programs, drawing pro-
 grams and illustration software.
 Through such programs, previous
 forms of artistic practice are main-
 tained, though at a qualitative level far
 below that of traditional tools and
 media. Thus, while trying to preserve
 a familiar mode, we in fact have pre-
 served only the appearance of the pre-
 vious mode, since the machine was no
 longer being used ("I will do what you
 want me to do") but started using the
 user ("Do what I can do, and how I do
 it")-the artist in particular. We knew
 that the hardware was not conceived
 for such creative work, but we hoped
 that some programs would do the
 trick. To a certain extent, this has been
 accomplished. But if art, at least in the
 romantic sense we still cling to, is the
 expression of personality, emotion,
 experience and the like, then the com-
 puter does not necessarily help the art-
 ist to bring it about more freely. Quite
 often, what is produced on the com-
 puter can be generated more easily,
 quickly and cheaply with a pencil or
 other traditional means. There are nu-
 merous instances in which the com-
 puter controls the artist and 'signs' the
 work. This is what I have called-
 and my formula has been widely
 adopted-'canned art'. There are also
 instances where the machine offers a
 fast substitute for art. This is what I
 called 'MacDonald art' [2].
 IS THE ARTIST
 A USER?
 Obviously a paint program, a drawing
 program, an image renderer, a ray
 tracer, etc. are computational models
 that capture knowledge about how as-
 pects of images generated in the past
 can be replicated. Whereas the artist
 working in traditional media invented
 new forms of expression, the com-
 puter program gives a prefabricated,
 general solution. Such programs are
 the how of art and as such are quite
 impressive in their performance. As
 explanatory models, they rely on
 physics (the laws of reflection, refrac-
 tion, etc.), linear mathematics (linear
 perspective, sectioning, solid model-
 ling) and logic (mainly Boolean op-
 erations). To what extent a good
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 explanatory model is also a generative
 procedure is a question raised again
 and again during the history of art and
 in epistemology. As it turns out, each
 explanation is incomplete. The per-
 spective from which the explanation is
 given defines the level of incomplete-
 ness. Within the perspective assumed,
 a good description can become a gen-
 erative scheme [3]. The golden sec-
 tion, the Fibonacci series, the formal-
 ism of the metaphor (logical or
 mathematical) can be used to gener-
 ate artifacts with expected or desired
 formal qualities. Based on this limited
 notion of generativity, various descrip-
 tions were used at the outset of com-
 puter art and experiments were per-
 formed in order to generate families
 of images or sound sequences. The so-
 called intuitive element, i.e. variations
 within a given frame, was ensured (ru-
 dimentarily I should add) by the use
 of random number generators. What
 resulted was a whole family (infinite,
 in principle, or with a degree of infin-
 ity comparable to the degree of ran-
 domness achieved) from which an
 'artist' selected what seemed aestheti-
 cally relevant. My own evolution went
 through this stage [4], which I actually
 enjoyed because of the unexpected-
 ness that randomness sometimes led
 to. It was a form of aesthetic lottery
 whose winners attracted public atten-
 tion, although it was not certain what
 was won. Nevertheless, the major ques-
 tion of whether a person (or machine)
 who describes art also creates art
 continued to obsess us. It seems that
 throughout the history of art the act of
 doing and the act of contemplating
 (i.e. what is known as theory) have been
 complementary rather than equiva-
 lent, and the hope of breaking this pat-
 tern enthused many.
 Things became more complicated
 once the instrument of explanation
 and the instrument of production
 became the same. Indeed, the same
 mechanism can be used to analyze and
 to synthesize. Data resulting from
 analysis (output from a process) can
 become the 'matter' of the act of ob-
 taining new artifacts (input of a re-
 verse process). However, the logical
 laws governing the function of the ma-
 chine require observation of stringent
 conditions for computability. Com-
 pleteness and consistency, to which a
 fundamental logical law applies
 (Godel), are not, by any stretch of our
 willingness to acknowledge logic and
 rationality in art, characteristics of the
 art process. Thus, the machine is
 intrinsically adapted to a universe of
 experience in which only partial ar-
 tistic practice is possible. Indeed, the
 very structured nature of the typo-
 graphic art makes it a good target for
 computer-based praxis-a theoretic
 idea that I expressed long before desk-
 top publishing was made into an avail-
 able key-system technology [5].
 Since any description-in the
 philosophic form of discourse or in
 mathematical-logical formalism-is,
 after all, incomplete and thus subjec-
 tive, once such descriptions become
 generative tools in the form of proce-
 dures or programs, they act upon the
 data (the 'matter' of electronic art) as
 a mold. The fingerprint of those who
 designed them gets marked in the
 image or the sounds generated. The
 'artist', consequently, is actually the
 machine, while the human being be-
 comes the operator working for the
 programmer(s). The uniformity of im-
 ages and musical compositions that
 strikes anyone who has gone beyond
 the initial moment of surprise and
 even exaltation is the result of the lim-
 ited number of programs and proce-
 dures available. Such programs, while
 deserving in many respects, were
 transported from machine to machine
 (sometimes losing efficacy compared
 to their initial characteristics, other
 times being improved) and became
 available in the broader market. There
 is no difference between a ray tracer
 in a sophisticated research or com-
 puter art center and the ray tracer we
 can buy for our PCs.
 Being such high performance ma-
 chines, computers are used to gen-
 erate incredible numbers of images
 produced in all kinds of environ-
 ments. However, we must make some
 distinctions. We look at images on
 screens in various contexts. Each con-
 text has its own requirements. Com-
 puter-aided design (CAD) images are,
 in virtue of their goal, supposed to be
 exact. Tools for achieving precision
 are continuously created. From CAD,
 we move towards computer-aided
 manufacturing (CAM), which implies
 precision as well but also some other
 characteristics, such as versatility for
 driving complex machines, precise
 time sequencing, even parallelism.
 Communication and entertainment
 applications (such as advertisement,
 mass communication, show business)
 have still different requirements, in-
 cluding realism. Simulation, by its very
 nature, suggests the need for conven-
 tion based on mapping procedures
 from the realm of simulated phenom-
 ena to the realm of knowledge. Dy-
 namics, as characteristic of simulated
 complex phenomena, requires inte-
 gration of movement. In addition, the
 code of simulation (as it applies to
 colors, visual rhythms, shapes, topo-
 logical changes) has to be conveyed to-
 gether with the simulation, which
 raises issues of communication. In
 each of the fields mentioned, software
 tools (indeed, the computer is not a tool-
 only programs qualify as tools) were built,
 tested and improved according to the
 specific requirements of the work.
 Artistic images are defined by their
 aesthetics; and the need for aesthetic
 characteristics is acknowledged. Yet
 while the aesthetic component is a
 structuring component that facilitates
 better usage, it is in fact only partially
 pursued. What those interested in the
 art did not understand about the tools
 was that it is not the precision of CAD
 that will make for art, not the sophis-
 tication of an integrated processing
 package that will make art programs
 out of CAM programs (even when
 used to drive a milling machine in
 order to create a 'sculpture'), nor the
 enticing commercial 'art packages'.
 Because the explanations used were
 explanations pertinent to any other
 class of artifacts but the artistic class,
 the result was contorted images, very
 technical, precise but not expressive,
 flashy but not convincing. In these
 images, a world of plastic, metal, even
 of gelatin [6] was constituted because
 CAD, CAM and simulation programs
 required the texture mapping of plas-
 tic, metal and other materials that our
 factories process, not because it was
 aesthetically relevant. Instead of allow-
 ing us to see whether explanations of
 works of art can become generative
 procedures, those who use expla-
 nations pertinent to engineering,
 modelling, communication, enter-
 tainment and simulation made us un-
 derstand that their generative power
 is not relevant to art and not equiv-
 alent to an aesthetic perspective.
 AESTHETIC
 CONSCIOUSNESS
 It goes to the credit of the industry,
 however, that it recognized the need
 for aesthetics in tools for practical
 activity other than art. But while I
 credit the visionaries-Alan Kay, Ivan
 Sutherland, Nelson Max, et al.-with
 this understanding of the formative
 Nadin, Emergent Aesthetics-Aesthetic Issues in Computer Arts 45
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 role of the aesthetic component, I
 must add that it is difficult to say
 whether the aesthetic component was
 viewed as a marketing tool, an alibi or
 an intrinsic part of the design of new
 tools. Nevertheless, in the databanks
 of the characteristics of artifacts gen-
 erated with the aid of computers and
 aspiring to the status of art, one
 will find the characteristics commis-
 sioned/required by those who sup-
 ported computer graphics research
 for flight simulators, radar installa-
 tions, satellite observation, space ex-
 ploration, oil exploration, design of
 new machines (cars and trucks, in par-
 ticular), etc.
 It is comforting to see that money
 invested in such non-artistic areas
 trickles down into the hands (and
 products) of those interested in art.
 But the inadequacy of such tools for
 artistic practice remains. The question
 of precision in art is different from the
 precision of engineering. The combat-
 ive nature of art is different from that
 of the military. An artistic artifact re-
 quires a different manufacture than
 that of mass production. Against the
 background of the digital (i.e., of the
 information- and symbol-processing
 paradigm), we arrive at the realization
 of the need to consider art in its inter-
 relations with all other products of
 human activity. The digital computer
 is the carrier of information and a
 means of maintaining simultaneous
 levels of information exchange. It al-
 ready supports unprecedented forms
 of human interconnection and makes
 available new types of interaction.
 Whatever an artist can do using tradi-
 tional means will not become more
 valuable once it is computer gener-
 ated. It is in the realm of what was not
 before possible that one can see the as-
 sets of this artistic involvement with
 technology. Digital carriers allow for
 interactive modes, for integrated envi-
 ronments, for mixed media.
 Nevertheless, all this does not come
 for free. Since more people can partic-
 ipate in making the work, chances are
 that, in the process, authorship and
 quite a number of characteristics re-
 lated to it will change. The digital me-
 dium is one of instant replication and
 perfect fidelity; therefore, the notion
 of the original, the aura of uniqueness,
 and the attraction of ownership will
 have to undergo reinterpretation and
 change. Our understanding of the
 artist-public relation changes as the
 distinction between artist and public
 gradually disappears. Indeed, in the
 electronic medium, everything done
 by an artist can easily be re-processed
 by the public. Variations become a
 matter of interaction with the work.
 The change is from a one-to-many re-
 lation to a sequence of one-to-one re-
 lations. Even the functions assigned to
 art change in the sense that an active
 relation rather than passive contem-
 plation emerges. As I see it, digital art
 ermeates the environment of exist-
 ence as a neverending process, at
 levels of quality perhaps far below
 those celebrated in previous stages of
 human practice, but reaching far
 more people (in principle, the entire
 population). Intensity is converted
 into extension.
 Based on some of these considera-
 tions, we should now consider the re-
 lation between the possible and the
 desirable because first, in the age of
 computer technology, the space of
 possibilities increases exponentially,
 and second, in the past, people desired
 new forms of expression and pushed
 the technology and the medium of ex-
 pression to its possible limits. Today,
 technology leads and actually offers
 more possibilities than we are able or
 even qualified to use. Consequently,
 desirability starts shaping us in our way
 of expressing convictions, ideals and
 values. Is it indeed desirable to use a
 paint program without ever seeing a
 painting or preparing a canvas, mix-
 ing colors, mastering a real brush? Is
 it acceptable to synthesize sound with-
 out knowing what is culturally acknow-
 ledged as harmony or tonality? Is it
 possible to conceive of an electronic
 sculpture independent of the context
 of the world for which such a sculpture
 is produced? I can go on and on with
 even farther-reaching questions as to
 the significance of color not only as a
 component of art, but also with bio-
 logical implications (its symbolism, its
 role in memory processes, the effect of
 the eye's color sensor on each per-
 son's well being, the behavioral impli-
 ations of color in a given culture).
 Indeed, art is far more than the mere
 physical presence of an artifact; and
 this is why the digital approach to art
 must consider the human being, so-
 ciety and its evolution under new cir-
 cumstances of life and work [7].
 The digital computer made pos-
 sible an accelerated integration of
 aesthetic characteristics in non-artistic
 artifacts. This has contributed to a dis-
 s mination of better taste through ob-
 jects of daily life and in communica-
 tion. Moreover, the digital computer,
 together with other electronic and
 non-electronic technologies, made
 possible and necessary patterns of hu-
 man interaction that affect the pri-
 macy of language and language-
 oriented work. We are already
 entering an age of varied means of ex-
 pression and communication in which
 taste, smell and touch as well as images
 and sounds play ever-increasing roles.
 Once the dominance of language
 ceases, we start living in a civilization
 of several modes of expression and
 communication. This in turn affects
 the relation between art and tech-
 nology as new arts appear and new
 forms of interaction with art become
 possible. It is probably worth the effort
 to understand this diversification as an
 expression of a new relation between
 what we call the tools of the artist and
 the medium.
 TOOL OR MEDIUM?
 One question is frequently raised: Is
 the computer a tool or a medium? The
 easy answer is: both. But easy answers
 will not do. In the strictest sense of the
 word, the computer is neither a tool
 nor a medium; that is, the programs
 are the tools, the peripherals (such as
 printers, plotters, CRTs, sound syn-
 thesizers, loudspeakers, etc.) are the
 medium/media. In creating a sculp-
 ture by driving a milling machine, the
 artist has to understand the relation
 between the 'virtual' object as it results
 after data processing and the 'real' ar-
 tifact that will (or will not) embody
 desired qualities. Many changes ac-
 cumulate between the plotted image
 on the screen and the Cibachrome
 print; there is a change in quality and
 quantity between the sound synthe-
 sizer and the final tape. This pro-
 foundly mediated process, which results
 in removing the artist from the 'mat-
 ter' on which he or she acts, requires
 skills different from those of the tradi-
 tional craftsperson. It is not that think-
 ing replaces the craft, but it diminishes
 the importance of craft in the actual
 making. I feel comfortable with the
 notion that, in the age of digital tech-
 nology, the program is the work of art, al-
 though I am not quite sure how such
 a work realizes its meaning. It is prob-
 ably, because I do not want to discard
 the thought, through the infinite use
 of the program, in which case all of us
 using programs are actually inter-
 acting with the art object called 'the
 program' and thus with the artist as
 46 Nadin, Emergent Aesthetics-Aesthetic Issues in Computer Arts
This content downloaded from 129.110.242.60 on Mon, 11 Nov 2019 22:37:59 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 author of the program. Whether or
 not this view is accepted, we still need
 to make clear that, due to the intrinsic
 characteristics of digital technology,
 there is no such thing as a computer
 artist who is not the author of his or
 her program. The very few successes
 we know of are the result of authentic
 mastery of the programming and the
 result of the attempt to create a legiti-
 mate alternative medium. Harold
 Cohen created not only the best com-
 putational theory of Harold Cohen's
 art, but also a tool of tremendous flex-
 ibility and respectable integrity. For
 those who want to be Harold Cohen
 followers, the use of AARON can be re-
 warding. But whether or not it is
 Harold Cohen who actually turns on
 the machine and makes sure it runs,
 the work is already signed by Harold
 Cohen; it projects his notion of art, his
 sensitivity and his particular aesthetic
 point of view. (AARON does not yet
 encode Cohen's aesthetics of color, so
 at least the color component is left to
 the artist.)
 Art is not possible without tech-
 nology. Nevertheless, art does not re-
 flect how powerful technology is, but
 how powerfully it serves the artist's ar-
 tistic means. The need for the 'disap-
 pearance' of the technology, for its
 'invisibility', has to be put in the per-
 spective of the why of art, as opposed
 to the how and even the what. In gen-
 eral, when the computer is visible, we
 are given an indication that the tech-
 nology is not yet appropriately assimi-
 lated in the activity supported. Man-
 fred Mohr andJohn Pearson are good
 examples for understanding the impli-
 cations of this principle. Their work,
 so different each from the other, is the
 result of integrating the computer in
 their thinking about and making of
 art. Both artists recognize the need for
 a powerful planning procedure, for an
 instrument adequate to the research
 of a personal aesthetic set of possi-
 bilities in which geometry plays an im-
 portant role without becoming a goal
 in itself. John Pearson confesses that
 the computer influenced his process
 of thinking: thus he felt encouraged to
 look at the many facets of an artistic
 idea and discovered that some rele-
 vant avenues explored in his work
 would have been overlooked had he
 relied only on intuition. He typically
 starts his creative work where the com-
 puter ends in generating the shapes
 that will constitute the invisible sup-
 port of the final image. Manfred Mohr
 discovered that his aesthetic interest
 in multidimensional spaces could not
 be efficiently supported without an
 adequate instrument for visualization.
 He does not continue the tradition of
 literary descriptions of such higher-
 order spaces such as Abbot's Flatland
 [8], but uses a constructive perspec-
 tive. Curvature, as evidenced in sec-
 tions of this space, thus transcends the
 realm of topology and becomes artis-
 tically relevant.
 Neither Mohr nor Pearson identi-
 fies hi  art as computer generated; and
 for someone who does not know what
 goes on in their studios, this is not rele-
 vant. At the opposite end of the spec-
 trum are Lillian Schwartz and prob-
ably Frieder Nake. There is a strong
 computer component, almost a decla-
 ration of computer identity, that is
 quite misleading. Actually the com-
 puter trademark is a diversion. The ex-
 pression is not the result of the hard-
 ware, but of an analytic effort. Nake's
 variations on Paul Klee and Lillian
 Schwartz's Mona Leo (juxtaposing half
 of the celebrated Mona Lisa and half
 of Leonardo da Vinci's self-portrait,
 suggesting that he was the model) are
 works with a precise aesthetic condi-
 tion resulting from the integration of
 the computer in the creative act. The
 analytic effort does not necessarily be-
 come art. Ending with a formal de-
 scription of a work (like my applica-
 tions to Brancusi's body of sculpture),
 the analytic effort constitutes a com-
 putational explanation, not a new,
 original, artistically relevant expres-
 sion. I give my own work as an example
 to clarify that the mastery of the com-
 puter and the mastery of art are re-
 lated but still quite different. One does
 not automatically result from the
 other.
 Can users, the vast majority of those
 interested in computer art, also suc-
 ceed? Depending upon what it means
 to succeed, the answer may be 'Yes'.
 Provided that we are able to adopt a
 different notion of art and a different
 notion of the artist, many arguments
 speak in favor of an increased inter-
 pretive approach, of more perform-
 ances and larger audiences, and of aes-
 thetic products new in their condition,
 impact, and cultural and social impli-
 cations. For all these things to happen,
 we have to gain access to the tech-
 nology in each of its various aspects
 while we simultaneously start-and I
 mean start-thinking about possibili-
 ties, about what is desired, and about
 what it takes to prepare the creative
 'quantum leap' promised by the prog-
 ress of technology and the experience
 we are acquiring. My position is that,
 instead of refusing theory, histori-
 cal reference, and culture-because
 some believe that these can obstruct
 the new and will subtract from our pre-
 paredness-we should involve them in
 our efforts. This becomes so much
 more critical today since there are very
 good computational models (i.e.,
 theories) that, while keeping close to
 the practice, also put this practice in a
digital perspective and thus turn out




 At various professional meetings, sem-
 inars, workshops and classes during
 my involvement with computers, I
 have suggested artistic experiments
 and new ideas for a creative approach.
 I have tried some and am still involved
 in others. Of these, several can be
 mentioned along the line of the ideas
 pursued here.
 1. Given the integrative power of
 the technology and the possibilities of
 combining sound, movement, images,
 etc., we can create an environment for
 play that documents itself in the data
 stored. Eventually a game can be con-
 ceived with events taking place both in
 sequence and in parallel, the outcome
 being the score for the next game, i.e.
 participatory performance.
 2. Using the networking power of
 the technology, we can access people
 in their homes and challenge passivity
 and complacency by making possible
 the interaction of all those connected
 through the cable systems.
 3. We can transform those major
 events of a democratic society-elec-
 tion debates, congressional debates
 and votes, referenda, etc.-into major
 artistic events, not only by recording a
 vote in a booth, but by making the act
 of voting an occasion for creative
 expression.
 4. We can make private art part of
 the community ceremony; we can
 make possible the display of what
 people draw, write or compose within
 a community and allow interactive
 changes.
 5. We can form our relation to what
 is already established by 'pumping'
 into people's homes high-resolution
 images of museum art; we can allow
 for interactive programs that will en-
 able the viewer to reframe the work,
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 alter it, associate it with other works.
 These electronic copies will give peo-
 ple a better understanding of both art
 of the past and new art.
 6.... more to follow, much more.
 Obviously, I am not suggesting that
 these are the only possible ideas, but
 that some of them and others, many
 others, will bring us to a more promis-
 ing domain than the current use of
 limited paint programs or sophisti-
 cated keyframe electronic animation.
 But none of these notions is meaning-
 ful if we do not build an aesthetic self-
 consciousness. Terribly engulfed-
 and justly so-in the technology of
 computer art, we meet and talk about
 pixels, megabytes, and call-up color ta-
 bles. This language is necessary if we
 want to understand howwe do what we
 do, but not what we do and why we do
 it. Aesthetic consciousness means the
 acknowledgment of aesthetic goals
 and the sharing of aesthetic experi-
 ence. Frequently, in the absence of
 such an aesthetic consciousness, we
 fail to understand our own work. This
 should make us reflect on our own
 standards with respect to the work and
 our discourse about it. The diversity
 that is possible today will become re-
 ality only if we challenge our own
 prejudices as they have accumulated
 from prior modes of expression or
 from recent experiments with tech-
 nology [10]. It is good that we share
 programs, that those of us with more
 resources are willing to disseminate
 our programs and experience. But
 this will not lead to more diversity. An
 animation pipeline used in several
 universities and abroad will remain
 uniform unless it is delivered with the
 firm commitment that it can be al-
 tered, that it can and will be creatively
 redesigned.
 And this brings up the final issue:
 how programs written for particular
 applications determine the output of
 so-called artistic attempts. My claim,
 admittedly expressed in radical lan-
 guage, is that art is made by artists and
 that a truly creative approach can take
 place only if we can give the artist an
 'empty' computer. What does this
 mean? Computers are cycles, storage
 and operating systems, input and out-
 put devices, compilers and/or inter-
 preters, utilities, procedures. When an
 artist receives a machine, even with the
 most basic configuration, the machine
 already has its pixels defined, its geom-
 etry and logic programmed. Whether
 Boolean logic and art logic are equiva-
 lent, reducible to each other, or at
 least compatible has not been suffi-
 ciently researched. But no matter what
 the answer is, the nature of the ma-
 chine as predetermined makes it a
 poor substitute for the empty canvas
 of the painter, the block of marble of
 the sculptor, or the blank lined sheets
 of the composer. We all understand
 why the computer industry maintains
 that, for reasons of competition and
security, certain limitations (the no-
 tion of 'proprietary information') are
 necessary. But art is 'hacking' and 'vi-
 ruses', not databank management or
 increased production. The industry is
 also preoccupied with providing tools
 for efficient work, not with the exotic
 realm of somebody's art. Conse-
 quently, the major creative effort of
 someone really wanting to use this
 technology for artistic purposes prob-
 ably involves finding ways to strip the
 machine and reinvent it in each detail,
 going into language, interactive
 modes, and input and output devices.
 Scientists as well as artists express the
 same need. "As an algorithm devel-
 ope , I cannot use a workstation that
 has specific rendering algorithms al-
 ready built into it," stated Nelson Max
 [11]. My own program, as it applies to
 aesthetic performance, is definitely
 xtreme-an empty computer. But
 given the background against which it
 is formulated, chances are that it will
 be implemented. Small steps in this
 direction (such as the generalization
 of associative modes of computation,
 supported by the hypermedia model)
 are already noticeable and have en-
 couraged creative applications. More-
 over, it may turn out that while the
 notion of processing is all right, digi-
 tal formats are not the only type to con-
 sider. Binary representation is power-
 ful but, as we know, not necessarily
 expressive. A compromise between
 precision and expressive power seems
 more appropriate and will result not
 in a computer (the digital machine),
 but in a family of machines (triadic,
 tetradic, etc.) that we should be able
 to interconnect while giving the ana-
 log a fair chance in the process.
 There are many reasons to be opti-
 mistic and, although the quality of pre-
 vious and current work is not among
 them, I would like to restate my re-
 spect for those who have failed. It takes
 failure, more than success, to open
 new avenues. In view of the implica-
 tions of the entire process, it should
 come as no surprise that a discussion
 of the emergent aesthetics cannot
 start with self-delusive value judg-
 ments. After all, to discuss aesthetic is-
 sues is to discuss the future.
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